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Previous articles examined international portfolio investments either by 
a single investor or to a single destination. We examine the determinants of 
international equity investment patterns using multiple pairs of source and 
host countries. Specifically, we investigate how the corporate governance 
institutions in investing and recipient countries are associated to equity 
investment and divestiture using the 2006 and 2008 Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) data. We find that source countries buy equities 
in host countries with strong governance more than in host countries 
with weak governance. We also find that investors from strong governance 
countries disproportionately sell more their equities in weak governance 
countries during the recent economic crisis. However, investors from weak 
governance countries do not demonstrate such divestiture pattern.
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INTRODUCTION
The determinants of international equity investment patterns 
between countries have been one of the fundamental issues in 
international finance. Although traditional capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) predicts the difference in returns and risks of 
international stock markets as the main force of international equity 
investments, empirical articles have pointed out that some patterns 
exist in bilateral international investment, for instance “home bias,” 
which CAPM approach cannot fully explain. Recent studies suggest 
that either imperfections in product market or frictions in asset 
market affect the bilateral equity investment patterns (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 2001; Martin and Rey 2004; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008). 
Corporate governance may be one of such frictions which drive the 
bilateral international portfolio investment.
Finance scholars have examined the role of corporate governance 
in portfolio investment. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) put it, 
“corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment.”1) Thus, when corporate governance of a firm is 
so weak that portfolio investors cannot be properly protected, they 
fear that there may be an expropriation by either management or 
controlling shareholders. In such case, portfolio investors may avoid 
or decrease investment in the firm. 
In line with this argument, previous empirical studies provide 
evidence that international portfolio investors may invest less in a 
country or a firm with poorer corporate governance. For example, 
Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) find that U.S. mutual funds 
invest less in emerging markets with weaker shareholder rights. 
Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009) also report that U.S. investors invest 
less in a foreign firm with higher levels of managerial and family 
controls, when the firm is located in a country with poor investor 
protection and disclosure rules. In addition, Giannetti and Simonov 
(2006) find that foreign investors are reluctant to invest in Swedish 
firms with weak corporate governance. However, a recent study 
by Kim, Sung, and Wei (2008) suggest that corporate governance 
of a firm or a country may not be a concern for a certain type of 
  1) Shleifer and Vishny 1997 p. 737.
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international investors. They examine foreign investors’ holdings of 
Korean stocks and find that international investors from a country 
with low degree of control-ownership disparity (presumably, a 
country which provides strong investor protection, such as the U.S.) 
indeed tend to invest less in a Korean firm with higher degree of 
control-ownership disparity. However, they don’t find such tendency 
among international investors from a country with high degree 
of control-ownership disparity (such as Italy): those investors are 
indifferent between Korean firms with high disparity and those with 
low disparity. 
Although the aforementioned literature provides valuable insight 
into the role of corporate governance in international portfolio 
investment, most of the previous studies focus on either a single 
country or a specific region as their experimental venue.2) In 
addition, as Kim, Sung, and Wei (2008) suggest, it is not clear yet 
whether international investors from weak governance countries 
are also concerned about corporate governance of host countries. 
Thus, we examine the role of corporate governance in international 
portfolio investment in more general environment and study 
whether research findings from one country case still hold in the 
multi-countries setting. 
Specifically, in this exploratory study, we examine whether 
international portfolio investors invest less in equities of a country 
with weaker corporate governance using multiple pairs of source 
and host countries. For this purpose, we use data from the 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), sponsored by 
the IMF, where the information on the balance of foreign portfolio 
investment is available for more than 70 countries. Participants of 
the survey includes countries with strong corporate governance (such 
as the U.S., U.K., Germany and Sweden), and countries with weak 
corporate governance (such as Russia, Argentina, and Venezuela). 
Countries which host portfolio investments are also divergent in 
terms of corporate governance. Therefore, using the CPIS data, we 
are better able to study the effect of corporate governance on foreign 
  2) A notable exception is Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005). They study stock portfolios 
of more than 20,000 mutual funds in 26 countries and find that those mutual 
funds invest less in markets with weaker investor rights. However, since most of 
the 26 countries can be categorized as developed countries with strong corporate 
governance, their results may not hold for countries with weak corporate gover-
nance.
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portfolio investment. 
As a related issue, we also examine whether international 
portfolio investors have withdrawn their equity investment more 
from countries with weaker corporate governance during the recent 
economic crisis. Previous literature suggests that as a firm’s prospect 
is worsened in an economic crisis, controlling shareholders have 
more incentive to expropriate portfolio investors. Having realized 
the possibility of more expropriation by controlling shareholders, 
portfolio investors reduce their investment in a firm with poor 
corporate governance and thus stock price of such firm exhibits a 
large fall during a crisis. Consistent with this projection, Johnson, 
Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) report that stock market index 
of an emerging market with weaker corporate governance declined 
more during the Asian Crisis of 1997~98. Lemon and Lins (2003) 
also find that, during the Asian Crisis, stock returns of Asian firms 
where managers had control rights, but separated their control 
and cash flow ownership were 10~20 percent lower than those 
of their counterparts. In our study, we confirm whether a similar 
phenomenon during the recent crisis is observed with our larger 
sample.
The key findings of our paper can be summarized as follows. First, 
we find that international investors — regardless of the quality of 
their corporate governance institutions — buy equities in countries 
having strong corporate governance institutions more than in 
countries having weak corporate governance institutions. Thus, we 
conclude that corporate governance plays a role in international 
portfolio investment for investors from weak governance countries 
as well as investor from strong governance countries.
Second, during the recent economic crisis, investors from strong 
governance countries sell equities in weak governance countries 
disproportionately more than in strong governance countries as 
previous literature suggests. However, in our sample, investors from 
weak governance countries do not differentiate their divestiture 
based on the quality of host countries’ governance institutions. 
It is a puzzle why investors from weak corporate countries have 
not withdrawn more from host countries with weak corporate 
governance during the recent economic crisis, although they 
differentiate host countries’ corporate governance institutions for 
their investment in equities during a normal period. This warrants a 
further study in the future. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
our empirical strategy. Section 3 explains data, and Section 
4 provides the empirical analyses of the relationship between 
corporate governance and international portfolio investment in 
equities. Section 5 provides summary and conclusion.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
We investigate the effect of corporate governance institutions in 
host and source countries on international equity investments. 
To do so, we model that the international equity investments by a 
source country are affected by (1) the source country’s propensity 
for international investment (2) host countries’ attractiveness 
and (3) the bilateral relationship between the source and host 
countries. Source countries vary in the propensity for international 
investments and host countries differ in their attractiveness as the 
destination of equity investment (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008)). 
Thus, our initial model is as follows: 
Inv G X
s S h
sh h sh s h sh= + + + +b b a a ε1 2
1 1
,
: ,..., , : ,..Source    Host .,H
 
where Invsh is the level of equity investment of source country s in 
host country h, Gh is a “corporate governance” variable, which is 
our main independent variable. A vector of Xsh contains variables 
controlling for the bilateral relationship between source and host 
countries, a s represents control variables influencing international 
investments of source country s, a h represents control variables 
influencing the attractiveness of host country h, and εsh is an 
idiosyncratic error.
When we estimate the effect of corporate governance institutions 
of host countries on international portfolio investments, we have to 
address a possibility that investment by source country s1 to host 
country h1 may be correlated to investment by source country s1 
to host country h2. For example, source country’s specific factors 
— such as financial regulation or investor’s specific preference — 
can influence its international investments simultaneously across 
different host countries. 
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Thus, we use a “cluster sample method” which is a general 
version of a short panel data method (Wooldridge 2003; Cameron 
and Trivedi 2005, 2009) for the estimation of coefficients.3) In the 
cluster sample method, each source country is regarded as a “cluster” 
— corresponding to cross-sectional unit in a panel data — and host 
countries for a given source country are regarded as “members” of 
the cluster — corresponding to temporal unit in a panel data. The 
cluster sample method can address the “within-cluster” correlation 
— correlation among investments from a given source country to 
different host countries — in a general level. Moreover, as in a fixed 
effect model of the panel data, unobserved heterogeneity of a source 
country can be addressed by a fixed effect estimation of the cluster 
sample method. 
Also, we need to address unobserved heterogeneity in the 
attractiveness of host countries. However, unlike the unobserved 
heterogeneity of source countries, when we address the unobserved 
attractiveness of host country using the host country’s fixed effect 
approach, a strong multi-collinearity problem between the fixed 
effect variable and governance variable will arise. This is because 
the corporate governance institution of a host country is a part 
of the host country’s attractiveness variables. Thus, instead of 
including host country’s fixed effect in our specification, we use 
proxy variables in order to control for the unobserved attractiveness 
of a host country. 
After considering all of these issues into account, our baseline 
specification becomes as follows:
Inv G X X X
s S
sh h h sh s s sh= + + + + +b b b b a ε1 2 3 4
1
,
: ,..., ,Source    Host h H: ,...,1
 
where Invsh is the level of equity investment of source country 
s in host country h, Gh is the corporate governance variable — 
which is our main independent variable, Xh is a vector of proxy 
variables controlling unobserved heterogeneous attractiveness of 
  3) For the similarity and difference between the cluster sample method and the 
panel data method, refer to Cameron and Trivedi (2005, 2009). According to 
them, “short-panel data can be viewed as a special case of clustered data” (Cam-
eron and Trivedi (2009), p. 306). One difference is that there may be no temporal 
order among members within a cluster in the cluster sample method.
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host countries, a vector of Xsh contains variables controlling for the 
bilateral relationship between source and host countries, Xs is a 
vector of variables controlling for the propensity of source country 
s for international investment, as is an unobservable fixed effect for 
international investments of source country s — which is addressed 
by the cluster sample method, and εsh is a idiosyncratic error. The 
coefficient of our interest is b1.
We also apply the traditional panel data method with two periods 
(2006 and 2008) to examine the effect of corporate governance on 
international investment. In this case, we use each source country 
as cross-sectional unit and year as temporal unit. In order to 
address the correlation across host countries within cross-sectional 
unit, we use various interaction terms. 
To examine the effect of source country’s corporate governance, 
we divide our sample into two sub-samples depending on whether 
a source country has “strong” corporate governance institutions 
or “weak” corporate governance institutions. We apply our 
baseline model to each subsample and compare the coefficients 
of corporate governance institutions between the two corporate 
governance regimes of source countries. We also examine whether 
the relationship between portfolio investments and corporate 
governance may differ across economic environments. Specifically, 
we examine the relationship in a “normal” period — i.e., before the 
2007 economic crisis and in a “crisis” period — i.e., after the 2007 
crisis. 
DATA
International Portfolio Investment and Corporate Governance
For international portfolio investment in equities, we use data 
from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) 
where information on the balance of foreign portfolio investment 
is available for more than 70 countries.4)5) The survey started in 
  4) Some of non-sovereign regions such as Hong Kong participate in the survey. 
However, we use the term of ‘country’ rather than the term of ‘economy’, which 
is a terminology used by the IMF, because we just include sovereign countries in 
our sample. 
  5) The CPIS data has been widely used in previous studies including Warnock (2002), 
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1997 and has been annually conducted since 2001. The number of 
participating countries has increased over time, and 74 countries 
participated in the 2008 survey.6) In the survey, each participating 
country reports data on foreign portfolio holdings for three asset 
categories such as equity, long-term and short-term debts by 
residence of issuers at the end of a year. We use foreign portfolio 
holdings of equities in this study. As shown in Figure 1, the number 
of participating countries has increased over time, and 73 countries 
report their balance of foreign equity investment at the end of 2008. 
The total amount of foreign equities held by participating countries 
shows an increasing tendency and peaked at $17.1 trillion at the 
end of 2007. However, as the 2007 economic crisis spread to many 
countries in the middle of 2008, the balance of foreign equity 
investment by participating countries substantially decreased to $ 
9.8 trillion at the end of 2008. 
For our study, we use the balance of foreign equity investment 
by each participating country at the end of 2006 and 2008. Since 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, 2008), and Imbs (2006). 
  6) The list of participating countries is available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/sta/pi/part.asp.
Figure 1. Number of Participating Countries and Their Year-End Holdings 
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the correlations between the balances of foreign equity investment 
of earlier years and 2006 are very high,7) and the current economic 
crisis started in 2007, we choose the balance at the end of 2006 to 
study a representative pattern of foreign equity investment during 
a normal period. Also, we study the balance of foreign equity 
investment at the end of 2008 in order to examine whether there 
is any change in the pattern of foreign equity investment during a 
crisis period. Table 1 reports top ten countries of portfolio equity 
assets and liabilities at the end of 2006 and 2008, respectively. The 
U.S. has the largest foreign assets and liabilities at the end of each 
year.
  7) The correlations spans from 0.98 to 0.99.  
Table 1. Top Ten Countries of Foreign Portfolio Equity Assets and 
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In order to measure the quality of corporate governance for each 
country, we use a survey result in Global Competitiveness Report 
published by the World Economic Forum.8) The World Economic 
Forum conducts an executive opinion survey every year on various 
aspects of business environment of countries. For this study, we 
use the results from 2006 and 2008 surveys because the 2006 
and 2008 survey results reflect the perception of business leaders 
on corporate governance as of 2006 and 2008, respectively.9) For 
each item in the survey, a survey participant evaluates the current 
condition of business environment in question on scale of 1 (worst) 
to 7 (best). As previous research finds that investor protection and 
disclosure rules are relevant in portfolio allocation of assets (Leuz, 
Lins, and Warnock 2009), we specifically choose four items from the 
survey as variables to proxy for the quality of corporate governance: 
(i) property rights (i.e., whether property rights are well defined 
and well protected), (ii) efficacy of corporate boards (i.e., whether 
investors and boards exert strong supervision of management), (iii) 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests (i.e., whether interests 
of minority shareholders are protected by law and actively enforced), 
and (iv) strength of auditing and reporting standards (Global 
Competitiveness Report 2006, 2008). Then, we construct a “corporate 
governance index” variable for each country by averaging the four 
variables. If the index for a country is larger, corporate governance 
of the country is interpreted as stronger. Table 2 reports corporate 
governance index thus computed with the 2006 and 2008 survey 
results for our source countries. The number of our source countries 
is 53 for both 2006 and 2008.10) In order to be included in our 
sample, a country should have information on international portfolio 
investment in equities and the quality of corporate governance. 
We also collect information on other factors related to international 
portfolio investment, as described in Section 3.2, for our sample 
  8) Data from Global Competitive Report has been used in previous studies such as 
Wei (1997), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998), Van Stel, Carree, 
and Thurik (2005), and Cornelius (2005). Especially, Cornelius (2005) has used 
corporate governance variables similar to ours.
9)  The numbers of participants in 2006 and 2008 surveys are 11,232 from 125 
countries and 12,209 from 134 countries, respectively.
10) Alternatively, we have excluded four countries (Bahrain, Cyprus, Mauritius, and 
Luxembourg) from our sample because they are centers for offshore funds. The 
results of analyses without the four countries are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in this paper.
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Table 2. Corporate Governance Index for Sample Countries in Year 2006 
and Year 2008






UNITED KINGDOM (6.28), 
GERMANY (6.25), SWEDEN 
(6.25), DENMARK (6.20),
FINLAND (6.13), AUSTRAILIA 
(6.10), IRELAND (6.03), 
NETHERLANDS (6.00),
AUSTRIA (5.98), ICELAND 
(5.98), NEW ZEALAND 
(5.95), NORWAY (5.88), 
SWITZERLAND (5.85), SOUTH 
AFRICA (5.85), CANADA (5.8), 
SINGAPORE (5.78), FRANCE 




SWEDEN (6.20), DENMARK 
(6.05), FINLAND (6.03), 
GERMANY (6.00), AUSTRAILIA 
(6.00), AUSTRIA (6.00), 
NORWAY (6.00), SINGAPORE 
(6.00), NEW ZEALAND (5.98), 
IRELAND (5.95), CANADA 
(5.95), SWITZERLAND (5.90),
NETHERLANDS (5.88), SOUTH 
AFRICA (5.85), ICELAND 
(5.78), UNITED STATES (5.73), 
LUXEMBROURG (5.70), 
BELGIUM (5.68), UNITED 







INDIA (5.60), MALAYSIA (5.60), 
ISRAEL (5.50), JAPAN (5.45), 
CHILE (5.40), ESTONIA (5.25),
MAURITIUS (5.20), HUNGARY 
(5.13), PORTUGAL (5.13), 
SPAIN (5.05), THAILAND 
(5.05), GREECE (5.00), 
BAHRAIN (4.95), CYPRUS 
(4.88), INDONESIA (4.83), 
COLOMBIA (4.68), CZECH 
REPUBLIC (4.68), KUWAIT 
(4.68), LATVIA (4.68), 
BRAZIL (4.65), KOREA (4.65), 
MEXICO (4.65), PHILIPPINES 
(4.6), TURKEY (4.60), 
ITALY (4.50), EGYPT (4.48), 
ROMANIA (4.13), PAKISTAN 
(4.08), POLAND (3.95), 
ARGENTINA (3.85), RUSSIA 
(3.75), BULGARIA (3.73), 
VENEZUELA (3.63)
(33 Countries)
CHILE (5.48), MAURITIUS 
(5.45), BAHRAIN (5.43), 
MALAYSIA (5.40), JAPAN (5.40), 
ISRAEL (5.38), ESTONIA (5.33), 
KOREA (5.3), CYPRUS (5.25), 
INDIA (5.18), PORTUGAL (5.18), 
SPAIN (5.15), KUWAIT (4.98), 
BRAZIL (4.88), HUNGARY 
(4.83), THAILAND (4.83),
GREECE (4.83), LATVIA (4.83),
CZECH REPUBLIC (4.8), 
PHILIPPINES (4.73), 
INDONESIA (4.63), EGYPT (4.6), 
COLOMBIA (4.5), MEXICO 
(4.48), ROMANIA (4.35), 
PAKISTAN (4.33), POLAND (4.3),
ITALY (4.28), TURKEY (4.18),
KAZAKHSTAN (4.15), 
BULGARIA (4.03), RUSSIA 
(3.88), ARGENTINA (3.8)
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countries. Then, we divide our sample into two sub-samples using 
the value of governance index variable. The criterion for the sub-
sampling is to have similar number of observations in each sub-
sample: The cut-off value of governance index is 5.63 in both years. 
If a country has its governance index value larger than 5.63, the 
country is defined as a “strong” corporate governance country. If a 
country’s governance index value is less than 5.63, the country is 
defined as a “weak” corporate governance country.11) As shown in 
Table 2, a group of countries with high corporate governance index 
consists of 22 countries, while the other group of countries with low 
corporate governance index includes 33 countries for both years.
Other Factors Related to International Portfolio Investment
To control for economic factors other than corporate governance 
institutions, we use variables suggested in a gravity model and 
other models for foreign portfolio investment. A gravity model has 
been widely used for trade in goods since the 1960s.12) The model 
explains trade in goods between two countries mainly by their GDPs 
and distance. Portes and Rey (2005) show that a gravity model 
can be applied to trade in financial assets as well. They find that 
international equity flows between two counties also depend on 
their market sizes and distance between them. Recently, Aviat and 
Coeurdacier (2007) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) also show 
that a gravity model can explain international holdings of financial 
assets. 
As suggested by a gravity model, source and host countries’ 
GDPs and distance between them are included in our model. GDP 
is a proxy for size of a country and distance is related to trading 
and information costs. Thus, the balance of international portfolio 
investment is expected to be larger when GDPs of source and host 
countries are larger. On the other hand, the balance of international 
portfolio investment is expected to be larger when the two countries 
are closer each other. GDPs for our sample countries are collected 
from World Development Indicators. Distance between two countries 
is computed as distance between their capital cities in kilometers, 
11) We also use alternative criterion for the sub-sampling that each sub-sample has 
similar number of countries. The results of analyses with these alternative sub-
samples are qualitatively similar to those presented in this paper.
12) Portes and Rey 2005 p.270.
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which is obtained from Gleditsch’s website.13) We use the natural 
logarithms of GDP and distance as used in other studies.
Then, we include source and host countries’ stock market 
capitalizations. Stock market capitalization of a country measures 
the size of the country’s stock market. In addition, if international 
capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) holds, international equity 
holdings of a country should be proportional to stock market 
capitalizations of host countries. Thus, we expect that the balance 
of foreign portfolio investment has a positive relationship with 
both source and host countries’ stock market capitalizations. 
Stock market capitalization of a country is collected from World 
Development Indicators. We also use the natural logarithm of stock 
market capitalization. 
Next, trade in goods between source and host countries is 
considered. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) find that there is a 
complementarity between bilateral trade in goods and bilateral asset 
holdings: As bilateral trade in goods is larger between two countries, 
bilateral asset holdings of the two countries tend to be larger. Thus, 
we include source and host countries’ trade in goods (export and 
import) in our analysis. Data on bilateral trade is obtained from 
the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. Again, we use the natural 
logarithms of export and import for a country.
We also include measures of “informational” or “cultural” 
proximity between two countries (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008): 
(i) common language, (ii) former colonial relationship, (iii) common 
currency, and (iv) common legal origin. We expect that as two 
countries are closer in terms of these measures, bilateral asset 
holdings of the two countries will be larger. We use a dummy 
variable for each measure, which takes a value of one when both 
countries have common language, former colonial relationship, 
common currency, or common legal origin, and takes a value of 
zero, otherwise. The information on language, former colonial 
relationship, currency, and legal system for each country is gathered 
from the World Factbook.14)
Lastly, past performance of stock market and correlation between 
stock market returns are included. It is well known that stock 
13) The data is available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data-5.html.
14) The on-line version of the World Factbook is available at ‘http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/’.
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returns exhibit a property of short-term continuation (Jegadeesh 
and Titman 1993, 2001) and such phenomenon of momentum 
in stock returns are prevalent around the world (Griffin, Ji, and 
Martin 2003; Rouwenhorst 1998). Thus, given the momentum 
effect, international portfolio investors may buy more equities 
from a country where recent performance of the stock market is 
better. In addition, according to a finance theory, it is beneficial 
for international portfolio investors to spread their assets across 
countries so that they can diversify away country-specific risks. 
The benefit from international diversification would be greater when 
investors put their money into a country of which the correlation 
with their own country is smaller. Thus, international portfolio 
investors may invest more in a country which exhibits smaller 
correlation in stock returns with their own country (Forbes 2010; 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008). In our study, we use previous year’s 
stock market returns as the recent performance of the stock market 
and compute correlation between two countries with monthly stock 
market returns of past three years. Data on stock market returns 
are collected from DataStream.
 
RESULTS
Corporate Governance and International Equity Investments 
Table 3 reports our first result. The results show that source 
countries — both with strong and weak governance institutions — 
buy more equities in countries having strong corporate governance 
institutions than equities in countries having weak corporate 
governance institutions.  The result holds in both the normal and 
crisis periods. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the result of year 2006, which is before 
the 2007 economic crisis and is regarded as a normal period. The 
coefficient on corporate governance index of host country is positive 
(0.64) and statistically significant at the 0.1% level. This suggests 
that investors buy more equities from host countries with strong 
corporate governance. 
For all the four individual variables on corporate governance of 
host country, the coefficients are also positive and significant at the 
0.1% level. However, the magnitude of the coefficients is different: 
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Table 3. Corporate Governance and Bilateral Portfolio Equity Holdings: 
Total Sample
Panel A: 2006














Auditing and Reporting 
Standards (2006, Host)
0.6420***
Log GDP(2005, Host) 0.3954*** 0.4099*** 0.3705*** 0.3648*** 0.4013***
Log Market Cap 
(2005, Host)
0.1375*** 0.1343*** 0.1417*** 0.1473*** 0.1136***
Log Export (2005) -0.1236 -0.1321 -0.1026 -0.1235 -0.1220
Log Import (2005) 0.2395*** 0.2422*** 0.2146*** 0.2607*** 0.2549***
Log Distance -0.5863*** -0.5841*** -0.5673*** -0.5709*** -0.5644***
Common Language 
Dummy
0.3832* 0.4099* 0.4244* 0.4532** 0.3217
Colony Dummy 0.4567 0.4858 0.4244 0.4904* 0.4557
Common Currency 
Dummy
0.9151*** 0.7974** 1.0436*** 1.0281*** 0.9145***
Common Legal Origin 
Dummy
0.3520* 0.3732* 0.3139* 0.2659 0.3684*
Stock Market Return 
(2005, Host)
-0.1668 -0.3443 -0.1598 -0.2425 -0.1195
Correlation Between 
Stock Market Returns
2.5985*** 2.5010*** 2.9002*** 2.9667*** 2.5833***
Sample size 1,556 1,556 1,556 1,556 1,556
F-statistic 136.1164 140.5992 124.9612 147.5209 138.7559
R2 0.5267 0.5348 0.5206 0.5082 0.5296
1.  We estimate  “cluster-specific fixed effect” model  with robust variance 
estimate allowing correlation within a cluster.
2. Legend: * p<.05;** p<.01, ***p<.001.
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Table 3. (continued) 
Panel B: 2008














Auditing and Reporting 
Standards (2008, Host)
0.6515***
Log GDP(2007, Host) 0.4235*** 0.4015*** 0.4602*** 0.3432*** 0.3899***
Log Market Cap 
(2007, Host)
0.1274*** 0.1366*** 0.1175*** 0.1421*** 0.1336***
Log Export (2007) -0.0845 -0.0932 -0.0888 -0.0692 -0.0853
Log Import (2007) 0.2290** 0.2507*** 0.2452*** 0.2013** 0.2526***
Log Distance -0.5958*** -0.5474*** -0.5867*** -0.5917*** -0.5818***
Common Language 
Dummy
0.2440 0.2819 0.2224 0.2370 0.2931
Colony Dummy 0.4325 0.4835* 0.4015 0.3996 0.3977
Common Currency 
Dummy
1.0385*** 0.9822*** 1.0004*** 1.2499*** 1.0885***
Common Legal Origin 
Dummy
0.4847*** 0.4802*** 0.4800*** 0.4505*** 0.4307***
Stock Market Return 
(2007, Host)
0.9843*** 1.1665*** 0.9227*** 0.8002** 0.5592*
Correlation Between 
Stock Market Returns
1.5352*** 1.7621*** 1.3443** 1.9899*** 1.5962***
Sample size 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,592
F-statistic 94.5836 91.8826 93.8501 90.5806 85.8788
R2 0.4817 0.4772 0.4864 0.4708 0.4687
1.  We estimate “cluster-specific fixed effect” model with robust variance 
estimate allowing correlation within a cluster.
2. Legend: * p<.05;** p<.01, ***p<.001.
Corporate Governance and International Portfolio Investment in Equities 19
The efficacy of investors’ control for management decision in host 
countries (i.e., “corporate boards” variable) is the most strongly 
associated with investment decisions in source countries and the 
efficacy of protecting minority shareholders is the least important 
for the investment.
The effects of control variables in Panel A of Table 3 are as follows. 
Both GDPs and market capitalizations of host countries are positive 
and significant at the 0.1% level. This shows that the size of a host 
country plays a crucial role in international portfolio investment. 
Distance has a negative sign as expected and significant at the 0.1% 
level. These observations — both size and distance are important 
determinants of international portfolio investment in equities— 
confirms that a gravity model holds in our sample of international 
equity holdings. In addition, the coefficient of import variable 
is positive and significant at the 1% level, which suggests that 
investors buy more equities from a country when the import from 
the country is larger.
Some of the variables on informational and cultural proximity 
between source and host countries are also positive and significant 
at least at the 5% level. Those variables are common language, 
common currency, and common legal origin dummies. Thus, a 
country tends to invest more into another country with the same 
language, currency or legal origin as expected. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient on correlation between source and 
host countries’ stock market returns is positive and significant 
at the 0.1% level. This implies that contrary to the prediction of a 
theory of international diversification, source countries increase 
their investments in stock market of host countries if the host 
countries’ markets exhibit the larger correlation with the source 
countries’ stock markets.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the positive relationship between 
corporate governance and international equity investment is 
maintained after the 2007 economic crisis. The coefficients on 
corporate governance index and four individual indexes are positive 
and statistically significant at the 0.1% percent level. The effects 
of control variables after the crisis are similar as before the crisis. 
Source countries buy equities more from host countries with larger 
GDPs and market capitalization than those with smaller GDPs and 
market capitalization. Those coefficients are positive and significant 
at the 0.1% level. The coefficient of distance is negative and 
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significant at the 0.1% level. The coefficient of import is positive and 
significant at the 0.1% level. Informational and cultural proximity 
variables such as common currency and common legal origin 
have positive effects on international equity investment and are 
significant at the 0.1% level. Both previous year’s (i.e. 2007) stock 
market return of host country and correlation between source and 
host countries’ stock market returns have positive signs and are 
significant at the 0.1% level. These findings suggest that investors 
increase their investment in host stock markets which perform well 
and are positively correlated to their markets. 
Table 4 shows how source countries with different quality of 
corporate governance respond to host countries’ governance 
institutions before and after the 2007 crisis. In Table 4, the 
coefficients of governance related variables are all positive regardless 
of the governance types in source countries and are significant at 
least at the 5% level. This suggests that both investors from strong 
and weak governance countries are more likely to invest in equities 
of host countries with strong governance institutions. 
Table 7 reports the results of the traditional panel data method 
Table 4. Corporate Governance and Bilateral Portfolio Equity Holdings: 
Strong vs. Weak Governance Countries
Dependent Variable
Log (2006 Balance 
of Portfolio Equity 
Investment)
Log (2008 Balance 




Strong Weak Strong Weak
Governance Index 0.7509*** 0.5956*** 1.2404*** 0.5243***
Property Rights 0.6262*** 0.5001*** 0.8298*** 0.3205***
Corporate Boards 0.7535*** 0.7303*** 1.2293*** 0.6328***
Protection of Minority 
Shareholders 
0.4013*** 0.2305* 1.1585*** 0.5736***
Auditing and Reporting 
Standards 
0.7274*** 0.6372*** 1.0301*** 0.3523***
Sample size 839 717 829 763
1.  We estimate “cluster-specific fixed effect” model with robust variance 
estimate allowing correlation within a cluster.
2. Legend: * p<.05;** p<.01, ***p<.001.
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for two periods. The coefficients of corporate governance variables 
are all positive and significant at the 0.1% level. This result also 
supports our previous finding that investors buy more equities from 
host countries with strong corporate governance. Furthermore, the 
interaction term between protection of minority shareholders and 
year 2008 dummy is positive and significant at the 0.1% level. This 
finding suggests that protection of minority shareholders in host 
countries becomes more important for international investments 
during a crisis period. 
Table 8 shows the results of the panel data method for strong and 
weak governance countries. Both types buy more equities in host 
countries with strong governance. The governance variables are all 
positive and significant at least at the 5% level. And source countries 
with strong governance become more attentive to the governance of 
host countries during the crisis. For strong governance countries, 
the interaction terms between all the governance variables and year 
2008 dummy are positive and significant at least at the 5% level. 
For investors from weak governance countries, however, only the 
interaction term between protection of minority shareholders and 
year 2008 dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level. Thus, 
during a crisis period, investors from weak governance countries 
become very attentive to minority shareholders’ protection. 
Overall, the results of this subsection strongly suggest that both 
investors from strong and weak governance countries are more 
likely to invest in equities of host countries with strong governance 
institutions for both normal and crisis periods. Our finding implies 
that both investors from strong and weak governance countries fear 
that when corporate governance of a country is weak, there may be 
an expropriation by either management or controlling shareholders.
Corporate Governance and International Equity Divestiture 
In this subsection, we examine the second issue, whether 
investors have sold their equity more in host countries with weak 
corporate governance than in host countries with strong corporate 
governance during the recent economic crisis. For this analysis, we 
compute the difference between the year-end balances of foreign 
equity investment in 2006 and 2008 and investigate what explains 
the difference. As explanatory variables of the difference, we use the 
same variables as used in 2008 investment in the previous section.
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Table 5. Corporate Governance and Equity Divestiture: Total Sample
Dependent Variable
Difference between Log (Balance of Portfolio Equity 
Investment at the End of Year 2008) and Log (Balance 














Auditing and Reporting 
Standards (2008, Host)
0.0227
Log GDP (2007, Host) -0.0740 -0.0759 -0.0655 -0.0800 -0.0759
Log Market Cap 
(2007, Host)
0.0145 0.0151 0.0125 0.0158 0.0148
Log Export (2007) 0.1035 0.1031 0.1030 0.1035 0.1036
Log Import (2007) -0.0625 -0.0613 -0.0633 -0.0604 -0.0615
Log Distance 0.0579 0.0603 0.0539 0.0625 0.0590
Common Language 
Dummy
-0.0949 -0.0931 -0.1009 -0.0908 -0.0928
Colony Dummy 0.1500 0.1517 0.1485 0.1491 0.1489
Common Currency 
Dummy
0.0717 0.0714 0.0613 0.0799 0.0745
Common Legal Origin 
Dummy
0.0228 0.0217 0.0285 0.0170 0.0201
Stock Market Return 
(2007, Host)
0.8614*** 0.8631*** 0.8793*** 0.8376*** 0.8442***
Correlation Between 
Stock Market Returns
-0.0937 -0.0796 -0.1433 -0.0567 -0.0872
Sample size 1426 1426 1426 1426 1426
F-statistic 4.3947 4.0682 4.9658 3.8566 4.1587
R2 0.0526 0.0525 0.0537 0.0523 0.0525
1.  We estimate “cluster-specific fixed effect” model with robust variance 
estimate allowing correlation within a cluster.
2. Legend: * p<.05;** p<.01, ***p<.001.
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Table 5 reports the results of regressions on the change in 
bilateral portfolio equity holdings using the whole sample. We 
find that the coefficient on governance index is not significant. 
In addition, neither of the four individual variables on corporate 
governance is significant. These findings suggest that investors do 
not sell more equities in countries with weaker corporate governance 
during this crisis. 
However, Table 6 shows that the divesture behaviors may 
depend on the quality of governance in source countries. For 
source countries with strong corporate governance, the coefficient 
on governance index is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
Among the four individual variables on corporate governance, the 
coefficients of property rights and corporate boards are positive and 
significant at the 5% level. Thus, investors from strong governance 
countries sell more equities in countries with weaker corporate 
governance during this crisis. On the contrary, for source countries 
with weak corporate governance, the coefficient on governance index 
is not significant. Also, neither of the four individual variables on 
corporate governance is significant. These findings suggest that 
investors from weak governance countries do not sell more equities 
Table 6. Corporate Governance and Equity Divestiture: Strong vs. Weak 
Governance Countries
Dependent Variable
Difference between Log (2006 Balance of 
Portfolio Equity Investment) and Log (2008 
Balance of Portfolio Equity Investment)
Source Country Governance Strong Weak
Governance Index 0.1442* -0.0692
Property Rights 0.1086* -0.0717
Corporate Boards 0.1620** -0.0143
Protection of Minority 
Shareholders 
0.1034 -0.0925
Auditing and Reporting 
Standards 
0.1024 -0.0537
Sample size 787 639
1.  We estimate “cluster-specific fixed effect” model  with robust variance 
estimate allowing correlation within a cluster.
2. Legend: * p<.05;** p<.01, ***p<.001.
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Table 7. Corporate Governance and Bilateral Portfolio Equity Holdings: 
Panel Data (Total Sample)















0.6525*** 0.5366*** 0.7201*** 0.3420*** 0.6499***
Year 2008 -3.3547* -2.5789 -3.9606** -4.5001** -1.5029
Corporate Govern- 
ance * Year 2008
0.1664* 0.0157 0.1118 0.5094*** -0.0039
Log GDP (Source) 2.3621* 2.4572* 2.2273 2.2221 2.5306*
Log Market Cap 
(Source)
-0.3784 -0.4303 -0.2754 -0.3411 -0.4220
Stock Market 
Return (Source)
0.5444 0.5298 0.6695 0.5432 0.5134
Log GDP (Host) 0.3930*** 0.3928*** 0.3720*** 0.3664*** 0.4011***
Log Market Cap 
(Host)
0.1391*** 0.1364*** 0.1436*** 0.1497*** 0.1344***
Stock Market 
Return (Host)
-0.1987 -0.3524 -0.2060 -0.2765 -0.1553
Log Export -0.0995 -0.1034 -0.0821 -0.1013 -0.0968




2.2221*** 2.1829*** 2.4543*** 2.5850*** 2.2218***
Log Distance -0.5984*** -0.5714*** -0.5851*** -0.5898*** -0.5803***
Common 
Language Dummy
0.3216* 0.3555* 0.3314* 0.3545* 0.3151
Colony Dummy 0.3651 0.4188 0.3166 0.5238* 0.3536
Common 
Currency Dummy
0.9313** 0.8616** 1.1540*** 1.1404*** 0.9818***
Common Legal 
Origin Dummy
0.4790*** 0.4829*** 0.4593*** 0.4330*** 0.4404***
Sample size 3148 3148 3148 3148 3148
F-statistic 92.9000 93.0863 87.0555 96.0733 89.4583
R2 0.4991 0.5011 0.4976 0.4841 0.4945
1.  Fixed effect estimation with robust variance estimate allowing correlation 
within a cluster.
2.  Constant term, the interaction terms between year2008 and Log GDP (source, 
host), Log Market Cap (source, host), Stock Market Return (source, host), 
Log Export, Log Import, Correlation between Stock Market Returns, Colony, 
Currency, Common Legal Origin are not reported in this table. 
3. Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
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in countries with weaker corporate governance during this crisis.
We also use the panel data method in order to examine this 
issue. Table 7 reports the test results for the whole sample. The 
results show that the year 2008 dummy is negative for all the 
five specifications and significant at least at the 5% level for three 
among them. This finding suggests that investors have withdrawn 
their investments from host countries in 2008. Furthermore, 
the interaction terms between all the governance variables and 
year 2008 dummy are positive. Among the interaction terms, the 
coefficients of governance index and minority shareholders are 
significant at least at the 5% level. We conclude that investors have 
Table 8. Corporate Governance and Bilateral Portfolio Equity Holdings: 
Panel Data (Strong vs. Weak Governance Countries)
Dependent Variable
Log (Balance of Portfolio 
Equity Investment)
Source Country Governance Strong Weak
Governance Index 
Year 2008






















     0.7172***
-1.0597
-0.0900
Protection of Minority Shareholders 
Year 2008




   0.2348*
-1.8986
    0.3532**
Auditing & Reporting Standards 
Year 2008




      0.6418*** 
  0.9041
    -0.2796**
Sample size 1,668 1,480
1.  Fixed effect estimation with robust variance estimate allowing correlation 
within a cluster.
2.  Constant term, the interaction terms between year 2008 and Log GDP 
(source, host), Log Market Cap (source, host), Stock Market Return (source, 
host), Log Export, Log Import, Correlation between Stock Market Returns, 
Colony, Currency, Common Legal Origin are not reported in this table. 
3. Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
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indeed withdrawn more from host countries with weaker corporate 
governance, especially from host countries with weaker protection of 
minority shareholders.
Table 8 shows the results of the panel data method for strong 
and weak governance countries. For strong governance countries, 
the year 2008 dummy is negative for all the five specifications and 
significant at least at the 5% level except a case of auditing and 
reporting standards. This finding suggests that investors from 
strong governance countries have withdrawn their investments 
from host countries in 2008. In addition, the interaction terms 
between all the governance variables and year 2008 dummy are 
positive and significant at least at the 5% level. Thus, from both of 
these findings, we conclude that investors from strong governance 
countries have withdrawn during the crisis. For investors from 
weak governance countries, the year 2008 dummy is not significant 
for all the five specifications. This finding shows that the divesture 
by weak governance countries could be fully explained by our 
control variables and thus there is no additional divesture due 
to the current crisis.  Interestingly, among the interaction terms 
between all the governance variables and year 2008 dummy, only 
the interaction term for minority shareholders has a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level. This finding suggests that 
investors from weak governance countries may buy more from host 
countries which provides better protection of minority shareholders 
during a crisis period.
Overall, the results of this subsection indicate that investors 
from strong governance countries have withdrawn more from 
host countries with weaker corporate governance. This finding is 
consistent with previous literature suggesting that since controlling 
shareholders have more incentive to expropriate portfolio investors 
in a crisis period, portfolio investors tend to reduce their investment 
in a firm with poor corporate governance in the crisis period. 
However, in general, we don’t find such pattern for investors from 
weak governance countries. Considering that investors from weak 
governance countries also show the preference for better corporate 
governance in a normal period, it is a puzzle why they do not reflect 
the quality of corporate governance institutions in host countries 
when selling their equities during this economic crisis. This 
warrants a further study in the future.
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CONCLUSION
In this study, we examine whether international investors buy 
less equities of a country with weaker corporate governance using 
multiple pairs of source and host countries. We also examine 
whether international portfolio investors have withdrawn their 
equity investment more from countries with weaker corporate 
governance during the recent economic crisis. 
We have found that both investors from strong and weak 
governance countries are more likely to invest in equities of host 
countries with strong governance institutions for both normal and 
crisis periods.
In case of divestiture, our analysis shows that investors from 
strong governance countries have withdrawn more from host 
countries with weaker corporate governance during the crisis. 
However, we don’t find such pattern for investors from weak 
governance countries in general. This asymmetric association is 
puzzling and warrants further research. 
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